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Ukraine’s unﬁnished natural gas and electricity reforms:
one step forward, two steps back
Agha Bayramov and Yaroslava Marusyk
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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to explain Ukraine’s natural gas and elec-
tricity sector reforms, to outline the challenges facing these
two sectors going forwards and to identify prospects for
renewables. It makes three core arguments: First, the reg-
ulatory templates promoted by the European Union do not
lend themselves to swift implementation. This is because
the EU’s approach has been supply-driven, in the sense
that it exports regulatory templates already developed
within the EU; it is not, therefore, a suitable problem-
solving measure for a crisis-stricken country with limited
capacities and powerful vested interests. Second, there has
been very slow progress made in innovative and creative
shifts in Ukrainian energy transition policy, showing a lack
of commitment to the transformation and modernisation
of energy systems that should in principle be based on the
promotion of new business models backed up by reformed
political, regulatory and industrial infrastructures. Third,
Ukrainian elites have been formally open to the ﬂow of
rules as evidenced by a number of agreements concluded
between the EU and Ukraine. But, in practice, the pre-
existing, deep-seated preferences of those elites have per-
petuated the opaque gas trading system, resulting in them
being very selective about the rules that they are actually
prepared to adopt.
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Introduction
Energy is at the heart of every state’s economic well-being, and thus its social and
political health. A well-functioning energy sector, which enables all other forms of
activity, is essential to economic and national security. The weaknesses of
Ukraine’s energy sector since independence in 1991 shine a spotlight on the
foundational link between not only energy security and national security but also
domestic politics and systemic corruption. The Ukrainian energy sector is
a strategic one prone to all kinds of risk, including ﬂuctuating oil prices, the
development of competing pipelines in Europe and the rise of renewable energy
CONTACT Agha Bayramov a.bayramov@rug.nl Department of International Relations, University of
Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
2019, VOL. 60, NO. 1, 73–96
https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1593210
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
sources (RES) (Wageningen University Report, 19 September 2018). While
Ukraine’s energy sector accounts for about 12.6 per cent of its gross domestic
product, the country’s energy intensity is staggering (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and
Pavlenko 2018). This creates a massive headwind that undermines national wel-
fare, disturbs economic growth and job creation, and leaves the country vulner-
able to political pressure from energy suppliers.
Late 2013 brought the so-called Euromaidan protests, which were trig-
gered by President Yanukovych’s decision to withdraw from signing the
European Union Association Agreement as well as his subsequent downfall
and Russia’s invasion of Crimea thereafter. Due to this conﬂict Moscow
unilaterally dismissed the 2010 Kharkiv Accords, which had oﬀered
a discount price on gas in exchange for its leasing of a naval base in
Sevastopol until 2042. Occupation of the Donbas region by Russian-backed
militants disrupted the energy structure of Ukraine. The country’s economy is
still in desperate straits due to the loss of infrastructure, in particular energy
infrastructure, and because of the severe recession of the past four years ﬁrst
induced by the war in eastern Ukraine.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine launched
crucial reforms to improve its energy security while simultaneously decreasing
its dependency on and diversify its resources away from its eastern neighbour.
Reforming its energy sector is key unﬁnished business in Ukraine’s both
economic and political agendas. Although there have been several reform
plans in the past, only after Euromaidan were energy security concerns
addressed on a qualitatively new level in 2014. Following this, in 2017
Ukraine adopted a new “Energy Strategy of Ukraine” until 2035 and began
accepting systematic and comprehensive energy reforms – ones that are also
forced on it by international donor organisations like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018;
Oxenstierna and Hedenskog 2017). Three simultaneous processes can be said
to characterise these energy reforms: pricing reforms; diversifying away from
Russian gas supplies; and, working on compliance with the EU energy regula-
tions within the framework of Ukraine’s “Association Agreement and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area” (DCFTA) that entered into force on
1 September 2017 (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018).
This paper seeks to explain Ukraine’s energy reforms after Euromaidan in
2013–2014. The country has experienced three serious periods of revolution,
and each (the others being in the years 1991–92 and 2004, respectively)
stimulated structural reforms – none as crucial as the ones following
Euromaidan in 2014, however. Therefore, the key question is whether
Ukraine has ﬁnally moved forwards or not. To answer this, the article dis-
cusses natural gas and electricity reforms, outlines the achievements,
changes and challenges facing the sectors, and explores the opportunities
for the Ukrainian natural gas and electricity sectors in future. The reasons for
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choosing these two sectors are that, ﬁrst, the energy sector is broad and it is
beyond the scope of this paper to cover all its parts (e.g. nuclear, coal, oil,
natural gas, renewables etc.). Second, the Ukrainian gas and electricity sec-
tors – both of which are the key subjects of the Energy Community (EC)
Treaty – are based on outdated Soviet-era infrastructure and anachronistic
law and business practices. The country is one of the biggest consumers of
natural gas in Europe and an important gas transit player – most of Russia’s
natural gas exports to the EU are transported through the Ukrainian gas
transportation system. Ukraine is also one of the biggest producers of elec-
tricity in Europe.
This article makes three core arguments: First, the regulatory templates
promoted by the European Union do not lend themselves to swift and easy
implementation. This is because the EU’s approach has been supply-driven, in
the sense that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the
EU; it is not, therefore, a suitable problem-solving measure for a crisis-stricken
country with limited capacities and resources on the one hand and powerful
vested interests on the other. Second, there has been very slow progress made
in innovative and creative shifts in Ukrainian energy transition policy, showing
a lack of commitment to the transformation and modernisation of energy
systems that should in principle be based on the promotion of new business
models backed up by reformed political, regulatory and industrial infrastruc-
tures. Third and ﬁnally, Ukrainian elites have been formally open to the ﬂow of
rules as evidenced by a number of agreements concluded between the EU and
Ukraine. But, in practice, the pre-existing, deep-seated preferences of those
elites have perpetuated the opaque gas trading system, resulting in them
being very selective about the rules that they are actually prepared to adopt.
This does not imply that reform is impossible, only that it is necessary to be
more cautious regarding internal challenges and not to expect unrealistic,
short-term results immediately.
The paper is divided into four parts. Following the introduction, the second
section critically discusses natural gas reforms. The third section then explains
electricity reforms and prospects for renewables. The conclusion presents the
paper’s ﬁndings and identiﬁes also its limitations.
Natural gas reforms and Ukraine’s integration into the European
energy market
In 2006 a dispute with Russia over the terms of gas supply and pricing led to
cut-oﬀs and reductions in delivery. Following this crisis, Ukraine launched weak
energy reforms such as increasing domestic gas tariﬀs and delinking transit ones
and the gas price (Pirani 2017). However, these were not actually implemented
and as a result the problems were never genuinely addressed; this led to
a second dispute in 2009. Moscow asserted that Ukraine had failed to adhere
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to provisions of gas supply and transit contracts. In response, Ukrainian oﬃcials
denied these claims and began again to strengthen Kyiv’s position on gas
matters vis-à-vis Russia (Radio Free Europe, 3 January 2009).
For example, in 2011 Ukraine became a member of the Energy Community
(EC), the group of East and Southeast European countries that have voluntarily
agreed to adopt the EU’s internal energy market legislation (Antonenko,
Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018). In 2014, Ukraine then started to negotiate
with a number of European countries – namely Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia – and their energy companies on enabling reverse ﬂows of gas
(Higgins 2014). Nevertheless, neither of these twin eﬀorts came rapidly to
fruition. First, Ukraine did little to decrease its gas dependence on Russia and
did not reform the energy sector to reduce the latter’s leverage over its
westerly neighbour. EC membership required both legislative work to imple-
ment the entire acquis communautaire – the body of laws governing network
energy systems in the EU – and institutional changes such as the unbundling
of diﬀerent functions within the electric power and gas industries. Second, the
reverse-ﬂow arrangements initially faced several technical and commercial
diﬃculties, some caused by Russia as it sought to avoid a loss of market
share or to exercise its leverage over Ukraine (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and
Pavlenko 2018).
Natural gas is one of the core parts of Ukraine’s energy mix, one that is
commercially utilised across both the domestic and industrial sectors.
According to Naftogaz Europe, in 2018 Ukraine’s gas consumption remained
relatively stable – increasing by 0.4 billion cubic metres (1.3 per cent) to 32.3
bcm as compared to 31.9 bcm consumed in 2017 (Naftogaz, 1 January 2019).
Gas plays a particularly prominent role in heat generation such as for the
domestic, public and industrial sectors. In the absence of a transparent and
well-regulated gas market, Ukraine’s gas supply and transit relationship with
Russia is widely understood to have enriched corrupt politicians and oligarchs
in both countries (Goncharuka and Stortob 2016). In this sense, decision-
making in Ukraine’s gas industry previously took the form of a series of tactical
course corrections – tailored to short-term political expediency rather than any
long-term strategy, and not executed according to established international
practices within the industry (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018).
In the wake of the Russian invasion, Ukraine domestic consumption dropped
dramatically – from 50.4 bcm in 2013 to 32.3 bcm in 2018 (Naftogaz,
1 January 2019). However, this reduced demand stemmed predominantly from
an overall economic crisis as well as from the fact that many energy-intensive
industrial facilities are located in the two eastern regions now controlled by
Russian-backedmilitants. A further reason is the rapid price increases for domestic
consumers and the removal of subsidies for some categories of them. Between
2014 and 2016, household gas prices doubled; this increase continued in the 2017
and 2018 winter seasons in order to comply with international requirements
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(Eurostat 2018). On 25 March 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted
the “Gas Sector Reform Plan” to decrease the country’s natural gas dependency
on Russia, to increase its energy eﬃciency and to meet the EU’s natural gas
standards (Radchenko 2015). According to the EC (2017), the plan is one of the
preconditions for further EU, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), European Investment Bank, IMF andWorld Bank assistance to Ukraine. The
three most important aims of the gas market reform being undertaken by the
Ukrainian government are:
● the creation of a competitive market underpinned by a legal and regula-
tory framework compatible with the EU’s own one;
● the break-up of Naftogaz Ukraine, in accordance with that framework;
● and, the abolition of price regulation as well as, in the case of domestic
customers, its replacement by a system of direct subsidies.
New legal and regulatory frameworks
One of the energy reforms of Ukraine is to simplify the legal and regulatory
requirements for the electricity and natural gas sectors. For example the
Ukrainian government adopted a new Gas Market Law on 9 April 2015,
which entered into force on 1 October 2015 (Legislation of Ukraine,
1 October 2015). It is one of the most important reform measures adopted
by the new government, and a key precondition of IMF ﬁnancial assistance to
Ukraine. It was drafted in cooperation with the Secretariat of the EC.
The law provides for full alignment with the EU’s Third Energy Package
(3EP),1 and creates the basis for a competitive gas market in Ukraine. The new
law deprives Naftogaz of its monopoly status, and enforces a break-up of the
company (Wolczuk 2016). Most notably, it strikes at the interests of one of the
most powerful oligarchs in Ukraine, Dmytro Firtash, who controls 80 per cent
of the country’s regional gas distribution companies (Wolczuk 2015). However,
the actual implementation of this law is still in question as it exists still only on
paper. Its implementation depends on an independent and transparent judi-
ciary system. As argued by Malygina (2010), the Ukrainian judiciary is not as
independent as it should be; the country’s courts have become part of political
machinations and often pass politically motivated sentences, and therefore are
a pawn in elites’ power struggles.
Traditionally, gas prices for both Ukrainian households and municipal heat-
ing utilities have always been heavily regulated and subsidised (Sendich 2014;
Rozwałka and Tordengren 2016). Because of these huge energy subsidies,
Ukraine had the lowest household prices for gas and electricity in Europe;
they were only one-eighth of world market prices (Eurostat 2018). The expla-
nation for this policy was that a few politically powerful gas traders bought
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large volumes of subsidised gas at a low price and resold it at a higher one to
industrial customers and exported it far abroad, making a few billion United
States dollars each year (Aslund 2016).
Due to Western pressure, Ukraine eventually had to stop this policy
however. More concretely, an adjustment of highly subsidised gas prices
for domestic use to market levels is a key precondition for IMF loans
(Oxenstierna and Hedenskog 2017). Without that organisation’s tranches,
the Ukrainian government would be unable to cover “the budget deﬁcit,
timely payments of pensions, payment of external debt and salaries, ﬁnan-
cing of the army and security sector” (Ekonomichna Pravda,
12 November 2018). In 2014, the average household price was approxi-
mately USD 24 per thousand cubic metres while the one charged to indus-
try consumers was around USD 242 tcm (Naftogaz 2014). Later the gas price
for most domestic customers rose to roughly USD 276 per tcm, while district
heating tariﬀs increased by an average of 110 per cent. As of January 2018,
the monthly utilities bill for an 85-square-metre apartment in Kyiv is esti-
mated at around USD 90, or about one-third of the average monthly salary
(Pirani 2017). In addition, the Ukrainian parliament adopted legislation
requiring all utilities to install heat and hot water metres – which is antici-
pated to further drive improvements in eﬃciency.
In place of artiﬁcially low gas prices, the government has instituted
a programme of more targeted direct payments to cover the costs of gas
and gas-fuelled heating. This programme does not employ direct cash trans-
fers to households that lack the ability to pay, the structure that is often found
in similar such programmes around the globe. Instead, the Ukrainian govern-
ment uses the consumer’s oﬃcial income and utility expenses to decide on the
discounted ﬁnal bill and to reimburse the company providing utility services
(Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018). However it is argued that this
safety net programme is far too broad, considering IMF estimates that as many
as half of all households receive assistance (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and
Pavlenko 2018). Thus, further work is required to improve the programme’s
eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has accepted a law to facilitate energy competition at
the industrial level but still lacks such competition on the consumer one –
because it has ﬁxed the energy price for households. The main problem with
this household price is that it is still controlled and determined by politicians
rather than by, ideally, the market economy. The Ukrainian government should
accept regulatory laws and legal instruments to facilitate market prices, but
politicians should not be responsible for x or y gas price (Chow 2016).
Additionally, it can be seen that Ukraine is undertaking energy reforms
because of constant international pressure to do so. This means that when
the leveraging of the IMF, the EU and the World Bank stops, Ukraine might
terminate its reforms.
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Prange-Gstöhl (2009) highlights that non-EU member countries tend to
accept external requirements due to reasons of identiﬁcation, independence
and economics. In the case of Ukraine, Wolczuk (2004) argues that its self-
identity and statehood are seen as European rather than Eurasian – so as to
make clear the diﬀerence between itself and Russia. Independence, mean-
while, means that Ukraine accepts EU rules because it expects the latter to
exert pressure on Russia should that country uses oil and gas as a form of
leveraging (Padgett 2011). Regarding economics, Ukraine aims – with the
liberalisation of its internal market – to access the EU’s own internal markets
and to attract its member states’ investments in its own one. According to
Oxenstierna and Hedenskog, “macro-ﬁnancial assistance loans amounting to
€3.4 billion have been committed since 2014, of which €2.2 billion have been
disbursed” (2017, 41).
A third instrument, a new law that implements an EU directive on the
eﬃciency of buildings, was adopted in June 2017, while a long-awaited
Energy Eﬃciency Fund was set up in September 2017 (Legislation of Ukraine,
22 June 2017). The need for energy-eﬃciency improvements across the
Ukrainian economy is enormous. In 2016, the Ukrainian government spent
roughly 70 times more on subsidies for public utilities than it did on energy
eﬃciency. Over the next 15 years, Ukraine is projected to undertake moder-
nisation programmes for buildings owned by national or local governments
that will cost approximately USD 65 billion; only a tiny portion of that amount
was budgeted in 2017, however. This clearly means that in the absence of new
investment, the government will continue to spend more on energy than on
eﬃciency improvements.
Finally, the Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Simpliﬁcation
of Some Aspects of the Oil and Gas Industry was passed on 1 March 2018
(Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1 March 2018). The law provides for the simpliﬁca-
tion of certain regulatory procedures, and is aimed at decreasing corruption in
the course of granting licences for subsoil use and providing more legal protec-
tion to investors (Dumych, Zheka, and Kravtsova 2018). In particular, the law
provides for the cancellation of numerous permits for the holders of oil and gas
licences – inter alia, mining allotments, permission for certain constructions and
approvals for the transfer of a company’s geological information to third parties.
The ﬁeld of land use is also covered. In particular the law allows the servitude
mechanism for the construction of oil and gas mining, and pipeline transporta-
tion objects to be used without changing land zoning (Dumych, Zheka, and
Kravtsova 2018). These rules are common all over the world, but it is the
transparent application of them that is missing in Ukraine.
On paper these laws look decent and positive, but the main question is
whether the new Ukrainian government has the capacity and political will to
actually implement them. Puglisi (2003) explains that there is a systematic
relationship between the political and economic elites in Ukraine, because
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 79
these two domains never became clearly separated there. As a result, oligarchs
systematically pushed through reforms that would help to preserve their status
while obstructing policies that would endanger their interests. Similarly, Wilson
(2013) explains that it is easy for them to push because oligarchic groups have
captured the legislative, executive and judicial apparatus. As mentioned above,
these laws are also accepted because of international pressure and as a result
of them being conditions for further support. They have not been initiated by
Ukraine on its own.
As such it is argued that due to political and economic obstacles and
resistance from oligarchs, the implementation of these laws usually faces
decades-long, insurmountable challenges (Aslund 2005; Kuzio 2012).
According to the literature, the reason for this is that the Ukrainian oligarchs
or elites selectively support these new laws (Aliyev 2016; Grødeland 2010;
Malygina 2010; Puglisi 2003). In other words, they back those that work for
them and resist the laws that make the further accumulation of wealth diﬃcult.
Malygina (2010) argues that by using informal practices, Ukrainian oligarchs
prefer to apply the “rule by law” rather than the “rule of law”. More concretely,
she explains that in Ukraine courts are privatised and instrumentalised to meet
the interests of diﬀerent actors and thus the law becomes a commodity that
can be purchased. For example, despite the fact that the necessary pro-
grammes and plans have already been prepared and approved, they have
not been fully executed, which has resulted in few eﬀective changes in the
country’s energy sector. This is what happened with the 2006 and 2013 energy
strategies too. Neither was fully implemented, mostly because unrealistic goals
and objectives were speciﬁed without consideration for existing economic
conditions and strong oligarch resistance (Chumak and Prokip 2018).
However, one of the key questions to be asked is what, if anything, makes
this time around diﬀerent. In answering this, it is necessary to consider both
the internal and external dimensions. Externally, Russia is under US and
European sanctions, which ultimately means that Ukrainian elites need to
decide whether they want to follow Russia or Europe. This was not the case
in the past. Related to this, Western countries are also now demonstrating
systematic levels of support (political, economic and technical) and leveraging
for Ukraine’s reform eﬀorts – also diﬀerent from the past (Oxenstierna and
Hedenskog 2017). Internally, meanwhile, Ukraine has a much stronger sense of
an independent identity because in 2014 it lost 10 per cent of its territory after
the Russian invasion – unlike in 2004, 2006 and 2009. Additionally, Ukrainian
civil society and volunteer movements were stronger in the pre-war years –
albeit imperfectly so.
However, similar to 2005 reforms, internally Ukraine is still struggling with
rich oligarchs, Soviet mindset business practices and corruption. Another
similar point is that there is still a lack of political unity and poor cooperation
between the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) and the Cabinet of
80 A. BAYRAMOV AND Y. MARUSYK
Ministers (executive branch of government). According to Puglisi (2003), par-
liament is one of the main channels via which business elites can defend their
positions, lobby for state subsidies, obstruct reforms and acquire personal
immunity from prosecution in Ukraine. In the same vein, several scholars
highlight that this situation has never gone away and that oligarchs controlled
parliament during the Kucma, Yushchenko and Yanukovych regimes (Aliyev
2016; Malygina 2010; D’Anieri 2007; Pleines 2009). By discussing the recent
parliament reforms, Aliyev (2016) highlights that not all members of parlia-
ment have extra-legal incomes, such as their own businesses, and that their
oﬃcial salary remains at around USD 300 per month – thus it is unrealistic to
expect informal deals between MPs and business elites to disappear.
Additionally the implementation of these laws might be disrupted by the
protracted political season preceding the 2019 presidential and parliamentary
elections, in which Ukraine’s voters will get their chance to pass verdict on the
domestic and foreign policy achievements and failures that have shaken their
country since 2014 (Balazs 2018).
Reverse gas ﬂows
The second energy reform includes reverse gas ﬂows, which aim to decrease
Russian gas imports and diversify Ukraine’s natural gas supplies. In 2013, gas
imports still came only from Russia and accounted for more than half of all
consumption (EIA 2017). Gas continued to ﬂow through mid-June 2014,
despite the annexation of Crimea and the reciprocal levelling eﬀect of sanc-
tions (Stulberg 2018). The gas cut-oﬀ temporarily imposed by Russia in 2014
occurred after negotiations had already begun, but substantive diﬀerences
were narrowed down without causing arbitrary transit shortfalls to Europe
(BBC, 31 October 2014). The trilateral package agreed between Ukraine, the
Russian Federation and the European Commission helped the country to
purchase suﬃcient gas supply for the winter of 2015–16, and also to ensure
smooth and reliable gas transit through its territory (Stulberg 2018).
With the opening of a reverse ﬂow capacity from Slovakia in
September 2014, Ukraine began to gradually diversify the route of its gas
supplies (Radio Free Europe, 16 August 2014). In a sign of the changed
relationship with Moscow, Ukraine suspended gas purchases from Russia in
2015 (BBC, 30 June 2015; Antonnenko et al. 2018). Consumption was reduced,
while Naftogaz reached agreements to buy gas from European energy com-
panies. In 2016, Ukraine halted gas imports from Russia altogether.
Relatively large shale gas deposits (924bcm) exist in Ukraine, but they are
not of key relevance in the short to medium term as the necessary funding and
technology to exploit them are currently absent. Moreover, Kyiv is now aiming
to expand primarily conventional gas production from the current level of
around 20 bcm to 27.6 bcm by 2020 (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko
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2018). This expansion seems diﬃcult to realise however, because the Ukrainian
government started the new tender process very late and furthermore it is not
transparent. As such, expanding conventional gas production will only be
possible if further anti-corruption reforms are implemented establishing inter-
national standards, a transparent bidding system and making the relevant data
available to everyone – which, in turn, would increase foreign investment in
the country.
It seems likely that Ukraine’s demand will be met principally from its own
natural resources, as well as by reverse-ﬂow deliveries from Central European
markets. With the current low levels of demand for gas, the country has been
able to do so entirely from reverse-ﬂow deliveries. Ending direct Russian
imports has been made a strategic priority by the government and by
Naftogaz, and it is argued that achieving this seems entirely possible
(Stulberg 2018). For example, total capacity for reverse-ﬂow deliveries – as
reported by Naftogaz after the expansion of the interconnection capacity with
Slovakia – is 22 bcm. It is argued that what post-Soviet Ukraine had not
achieved after 20 years of existence became possible within only 18 months.
Given the considerable potential for energy savings and reverse ﬂows of
Russian gas from the EU, Ukraine’s overwhelming dependence on energy
sourced from its eastern neighbour has declined dramatically (Stulberg 2018).
The commencement of reverse-ﬂow deliveries of gas to Ukraine via
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 2014 initiated a measure of competition
between these volumes, priced in relation to the European market. In 2016,
Ukraine imported 11.1 bcm of gas from the EU: from Slovakia 9.1bcm, Hungary
1 bcm and Poland 1 bcm. In the third quarter, in particular, the prices of
reverse-ﬂow deliveries (as reported by the Ministry of Economy, based on
customs data covering both Naftogaz and non-Naftogaz imports) were sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the ones Gazprom oﬀered for that. While this costs
Ukraine extra money, it also undermines Gazprom’s energy leverage. One
sign of progress in energy market reform is the entry into the Ukrainian one
of three traders already operating in the European market: Engie, Trailstone
and DufEnergy (Engie, 28 October 2018). All three have prominently partici-
pated in exporting reverse-ﬂow gas to Ukraine since 2014, while in
October 2016 they signed agreements about transporting and storing gas in
the country; Engie began to do this in small volumes from January 2017.
When evaluating Ukrainian energy reforms, it may be helpful to think of two
key points. The ﬁrst is related to the Russia–Ukraine gas trade: eﬀorts are made
by the latter to minimise its dependence on gas imports from the former while
simultaneously seeking to maximise dependency on European reverse gas
ﬂows. While Ukraine has indeed decreased direct gas ﬂows from Russia the
question still remains: What is the original source of this reverse gas? Is it really
European, or is it rather the Russian gas that European companies buy and
then sell again to Ukraine? It is more likely the second.
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However, Moscow might not be able to use energy supplies as leverage
against Kiev to the same degree that it used to previously (Bayramov 2018;
Grigas 2017). More speciﬁcally, Russia will struggle to pressure Ukraine since
the latter can simply purchase Gazprom’s gas from the company’s European
customers under EU energy market regulations – which protect the rights of
energy consumers and prevents energy monopolisation. A key advantage of
the reverse ﬂows from interconnectors with Slovakia and others is that it is
priced competitively under EU market regulations, whereas the gas imported
via the country’s eastern border comes on long-term and take-or-pay contracts
with oil indexation (Padgett 2011). Therefore, Ukraine aims to be insured under
this liberalised and regulated EU gas market as it strives to make leveraged
Russian energy a blunt tool. While this energy strategy might bring Ukraine
under EU protection, it will not fully secure the country’s natural gas ﬂows.
Rather, it changes the supplier from A to B and thus this time around the
country is becoming more dependent on European companies instead – which
goes against the new energy package’s underlying goals.2
Second, it is not only Ukraine but also indeed Russia that seeks to diversify
gas transit away from the former (Pirani 2017). The volume of Russian gas
being transported across Ukraine has been in long-term decline, from 128.5
bcm in 2006 to 67.1 bcm in 2015 – though recovering by 22 per cent, to 82.2
bcm, in 2016 (Pirani 2017, 2018). Although this ﬁgure then increased to 93.5
bcm in 2017, it fell by 7 per cent to 86.6 bcm in 2018 (Reuters, 2 January 2019).
The main reason for higher transit volumes in 2016 was the increased quantity
of Russian exports to Europe, made possible by Gazprom’s more ﬂexible
pricing policies, high European import demand and the lack of competition
from liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG). The utilisation of Nord Stream’s pipeline has
been rising steadily, with total volumes transported via it rising from 23.8 bcm
in 2013 to a record of 58.8 bcm in 2018 due to the completion of a second one
(Nord-Stream press release 2019). The European Commission (EC) regulatory
decision approving Gazprom’s access to 80 per cent of the OPAL pipeline’s
transport potential, taken in October 2016, might allow the Russian state
enterprise to use close to the full capacity of Nord Stream (55 bcm) during
high seasonal demand, reducing transit via Ukraine by a further 10 bcm.
Overall, it can be argued that the rapid implementation of gas market
reforms is unlikely. The 2015 law is just the ﬁrst of a series of long and
challenging reform measures. The regulatory templates promoted by the EU
do not, as noted, lend themselves to swift and easy implementation. This is
because the EU’s approach neglects the fact that informal rules matter in
Ukraine. Malygina (2010) explains that the formal framework only limits the
scope of action, but actors are not guided in their behaviour by these formal
rules. Thus while Ukrainian politicians, on the surface at least, try to adhere to
the former logics, they are guided in their actions both by formal and informal
logics. Abbott and Wallace (2009) emphasise that this is a common practice in
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the former Soviet countries but it can take multiple forms, have varying eﬀects
and include diﬀerent interest groups.
In this sense, the EU needs to understand these diﬀerences when support-
ing the post-Soviet countries. Its templates haves been supply-driven, in the
sense that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the EU; it
is not, therefore, a suitable problem-solving measure for a crisis-stricken coun-
try with limited capacities and resources on the one hand and powerful vested
interests on the other. As Magen notes, ‘the complex, detailed and dynamic
nature of the regulatory framework raises both substantive and procedural
diﬃculties for any third country intended on full or partial alignment with the
acquis’(2007, 366).
Restructuring the energy sector is a particularly demanding process, one
requiring an overhaul of the entire regulatory framework, de-monopolisation
as well as fundamental reorganisation of how accompanying infrastructure is
even managed. It is important to note that some oligarchs are now actively
involved in the promotion of Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU
because that would help facilitate access to Western markets and, at the
same time, increase the level of protection of property rights in the country –
thus securing the oligarchs’ own positions (Malygina 2010). In this sense,
Pleines (2009) highlights that Ukrainian oligarchs seek only economic and
not political integration with the EU. Reforming the energy sector will be
a long-term challenge, and thus it remains to be seen whether Ukraine will
be the ﬁrst country in the “common neighbourhood” to break the vicious circle
of energy dependence, ineﬃciency and corruption (Wolczuk 2016). In so
doing, Ukraine should not replicate Georgia’s mistake – with that country
eliminating Russian energy dependency but coming to rely on Azerbaijan
instead (Bayramov and Nolan 2017).
Reforming Naftogaz
The ﬁnal consideration regarding energy reforms is the desperate need for
Naftogaz itself to be restructured, that for greater transparency, eﬃciency and
responsiveness in light of changing market circumstances (OECD Report 2018).
Naftogaz and its subsidiaries: build, operate and maintain transit oil and gas
pipelines; distribute gas; operate gas storage facilities; explore for and produce
oil and gas across Ukraine; and, provide numerous ancillary services too.
Naftogaz is the single-largest contributor to the state budget of USD
3.9 billion, accounting for about 15 per cent of the 2017 one (Naftogas
Annual Report 2017). There are two core reasons why Naftogaz still needs to
be reformed: ﬁrst, restructuring the company is a requirement under the EC
and Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU, and, second, it is also
a condition built into the country’s programmes with international ﬁnancial
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institutions including the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD (Dumych, Zheka,
and Kravtsova 2018).
Ever since Ukraine became a member of the EC in 2011, it has been clear
that the state would need to restructure Naftogaz; actual progress has stalled,
however, due to entrenched corrupt practices. Momentum has only gathered
in the past two years, after earlier failed attempts at restructuring. In 2016, the
Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining submitted an unbundling plan to the EC
following an independent audit (OECD Report 2018). The 3EP stipulates trans-
mission unbundling and recognises three main models for the energy sector:
ownership unbundling (OU), independent system operator (ISO) and indepen-
dent transmission operator (ITO).
Comparison with nearby EU countries has shown that a mixture of models
have been adopted. Many of the operators in the larger and more mature EU
markets have implemented the OU model, which is more compatible with
eﬃcient and eﬀective market competition – a direction in which Ukraine is
seeking to go. The unbundling of Naftogaz is an important issue because the
future contract between it and Gazprom should ideally be covered by a new,
fully certiﬁed transmission system operator (TSO). Additionally, unbundling is
crucial to attract investment from reliable EU companies and banks so as to
help modernise the Ukrainian transit gas system (World Bank 2016). According
to a recent OECD Report (2018), while Neftogaz has accepted unbundling on
paper it has not actually given the required authorisation for that to its newly
established supervisory board.
Naftogaz has put in place a detailed corporate governance action plan, with
the stated goal of creating greater transparency and increasing the predict-
ability of company decision-making. However, these steps forwards were
accompanied by delays and obstacles because the Cabinet and Naftogaz
management have been actively ﬁghting each other (Financial Times,
21 September 2017). In April 2016 the ﬁrst iteration of the aforementioned
independent supervisory board was appointed, but a year after – in
September 2017 – all of its independent members, and even one of the
government representatives sitting on it, resigned citing “political meddling
in Naftogaz’s work” (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018). A replacement
supervisory board was appointed in November 2017. Many analysts argue that
securing a long-term role for Ukraine in the European energy security matrix
will require eﬀective unbundling of Naftogaz, improvement in regulatory
processes, the establishment of a professional and impartial TSO on the basis
of EU law, as well as further investment in the modernisation of the system –
perhaps from Western companies (e.g. Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko
2018; Dumych, Zheka, and Kravtsova 2018; Haring 2017; Pirani 2017).
However, while reforming Naftogaz, the IMF and the state enterprise’s
management staﬀ have faced a number of obstacles – while certain crucial
factors have been left unaddressed (European Commission 2016; OECD Report
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2018). First, corruption is still an everyday reality in Ukraine’s regional distribu-
tional companies. Second, the status of Naftogaz subsidiaries remains unclear
and the supervisory board has never been granted the power to approve the
core strategy as well as the ﬁnancial and investment plans of the company.
Third, work on the separation out of its transport division, Ukrtransgaz, has
been postponed until the completion of arbitration proceedings in
Stockholm.3 Fourth, the process has been disrupted by political and parlia-
mentary opposition to it. Fifth, attempts to ﬁnd investors in Ukraine’s transmis-
sion system have made little headway due to the uncertainties surrounding
the future of the gas transit business, as mentioned above. Sixth and ﬁnally,
the abolition of price regulation – and in particular the liberalisation of those
for domestic customers – may prove the most diﬃcult part of the reform to
complete (Pirani 2017).
Reforms in the electricity sector
Compared to its gas sector, Ukraine’s electricity one has received scant aca-
demic attention despite its importance to the country’s economy and security.
While natural gas fuels the majority of the supply of district heating systems,
electricity powers the compressors, light, power and pumps that move heated
water around the distribution networks to reach consumers. Most of the
power-generation resources in Ukraine will reach the end of their life cycle
within the next decade, and will need to be replaced or upgraded. The reason
for this is that almost all of Ukraine’s power plants date back to Soviet times,
and around half of them are over 40 years old. Being the eighth-largest
producer globally, more than 50 per cent of Ukraine’s electricity is generated
from nuclear power – with an additional 30 per cent from coal and less than
3 per cent from RES (Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018).
Ukraine has committed to reforming its electricity sector in several ways:
through the Association Agreement, the EC Treaty and the Memorandum of
Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership (European Parliament,
July 2017). More concretely, Ukraine’s power sector must meet EU environ-
mental standards as a requirement under the EU Association Agreement
(Antonenko, Nitsovych, and Pavlenko 2018; Dumych, Zheka, and Kravtsova
2018). Ukraine remains one of the largest electricity consumers in Europe,
even after the economic contraction caused largely by the conﬂict in the
country’s east (Eurostat 2017). Total installed capacity amounts to 55.3 giga-
watts, of which approximately 3.2 GW – mostly obtained from power plants
burning anthracite coal – have been aﬀected by the conﬂict in eastern Ukraine.
The country’s electricity sector is dominated by three companies: namely,
Ukrenergo, Energoatom and Ukrhidroenergo (OECD Report 2018).
To improve its electricity sector, the new Ukrainian government has initiated
a number of reforms. The ﬁrst key objective is to create a competitive
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wholesale and retail electricity market to the beneﬁt of citizens of Ukraine,
ensuring that the sector is open to new entrants, transparent in terms of its
management and oﬀers a genuine choice to consumers. This agenda is vast
and very ambitious, considering Ukraine’s starting point. In this sense, on
22 September 2016, a Law on Energy and Utilities Regulator was adopted
and a draft Electricity Market Law passed its ﬁrst reading in parliament
(Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 3 February 2016). Another major breakthrough
was the adoption of the new Electricity Market Law in April 2017, based on the
3EP (Verhkovna Rada of Ukraine, 21 February 2017). The law introduces prin-
ciples of fair competition and non-discriminatory participation in the electricity
market, equal rights to sell and buy electricity, free choice for consumers to
select their power suppliers, third-party access to transmission and distribution
grids, and price- and tariﬀ-setting that reﬂect actual costs (Radchenko et al.
2018). The law is designed to divide the current “single-buyer” model into six
new markets: (1) the market of bilateral contracts; (2) the day-ahead market; (3)
the intraday market; (4) the balancing market; (5) the market for ancillary
services; and, (6) the retail market (Radchenko et al. 2018). The National
Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission has drafted the rules for the
functioning of the new market and has held public consultations on
a number of other important secondary legislation drafts too (rules for trans-
mission and distribution system operators).
The reform of the electricity market touches on the nuclear and coal sectors,
since they are Ukraine’s main means of electricity generation (Dumych, Zheka,
and Kravtsova 2018). This means that the country needs to be comprehensive
in its approach to the market and infrastructure, as well as to the impact of
both sectors on the national electricity market. The objective of Ukraine here is
to decarbonise its economy, as stated in its Energy Strategy 2035 (Logatskiy
2018). This means taking a careful and thoughtful approach to the challenges
of the coal sector, including the closure of ineﬃcient or dangerous mines –
where the EU can provide assistance, with its experience.
Nonetheless, similar to the natural gas sector reforms, the key challenge
that now lies ahead is to actually implement these laws. First, as of the start of
2018, the internal power sector debt was USD 1.04 billion. Meanwhile, the
independence of the regulator continues to be a key challenge, without which
the electricity market will fail to perform to the beneﬁt of society and the
economy – as the regulator is heavily inﬂuenced politically, and under oli-
garchic control. Additionally, the new Electricity Market Law will not take full
eﬀect until July 2019. During the transition period, there is a risk that oppo-
nents of the new law will either be able to obstruct its implementation or steer
it in a manner favourable only to their own narrow interests.
As argued by Puglisi (2003), in Ukraine economic liberalisation has been
pushed only as far as allowing the privatisation of state assets – but not the
correction of market distortions. In the same vein Klimina (2015) highlights
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that, due to their political, economic and media power, a few extremely
wealthy people obtained state-controlled assets when economic liberalisation
reforms ﬁrst began. Additionally, Ukrenergo’s unbundling awaits actual imple-
mentation. According to the latest OECD Report (2018), the reorganisation and
reform plans of Ukrenergo have not been fully implemented and are currently
stalled. Finally, according to a recent IMF Report (2017) the level of corruption
is extremely high in Ukraine and its energy sector, which creates barriers to
new actors entering the market. As a result, there is still only low-level
competition between electricity producers and a lack of cost eﬃciency.
Renewable energy: new energy hope for Ukraine?
It is important to highlight that today electricity is produced not only from coal
and nuclear power but also from RES such as solar, wind, hydropower and
geothermal. For example, electricity from RES already in 2015 saved the EU
several billion euros in fossil fuel imports. It is expected that these savings will
increase by 2030. More than one million jobs have already been created due to
renewable electricity production, in fact. Meanwhile, many EU citizens today
are no longer only consumers but now also producers of electricity too
(European Commission 2018).
This is the future that might be possible for Ukraine as well, with the
necessary political will and determination. Considering Ukrainian reforms and
its new energy strategy, it can be argued that RES should be one of the fastest-
growing sources of power in the country over the coming years. Ukraine has
sought to ensure that, by 2020, the share of RES in overall energy consumption
will be 11 per cent. However, considering current developments, this goal
seems unlikely to be reached. According to the BP Statistical Review of World
Energy (2016), only a comparatively small portion of the country’s total energy
consumption is currently accounted for by RES (approximately 1 per cent). At
the end of 2017, the total installed capacity of the “green” energy sector in
Ukraine amounted to almost 1,375 megawatts – with a 1.44 per cent share in
electricity generation (Unian, 10 January 2018). Put bluntly, the share of renew-
able energy in Ukrainian domestic supply is currently unimportant.
In this sense, the development of renewable energy in Ukraine is progres-
sing slowly because it comes with both a lack of domestic ﬁnancing and of
foreign investment. The most signiﬁcant challenges faced in expanding the
renewable energy sector are cost competitiveness and the ﬁnancing of related
technologies and projects. Existing subsidies for traditional energy sources and
other market distortions only heighten these obstacles (Wageningen
University Report, 21 September 2018).
Only in February 2018 did Ukraine become a member of the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) that would support the country in the
transference of knowledge and technology in the process of making an
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energy transition. As a result of joining this organisation, Ukrainian compa-
nies that work in the sphere of renewables will receive a number of
beneﬁts – such as being able to apply to the Abu Dhabi Fund of
Development (ADFD) to receive subsidised credits, to use the other ﬁnancial
instruments available for members and being able to cooperate with other
member countries. In this sense, the ultimate goal of Ukraine’s membership
in IRENA should be to increase its share of RES – which would lead to the
replacement of imported fossil fuels, and reduce the country’s external
energy dependence (Ekologiya Pidpryjemstva 2018; Antonenko, Nitsovych,
and Pavlenko 2018). For example, IRENA predicts that Ukraine has the
potential to increase its share of renewables by up to 20–25 per cent by
2030 (IRENA2014, 1). The highest potential is in expanding the country’s
utilisation of biomass because of the abundance of fertile black soil there,
further to extensive agricultural and forestry waste too.
Nevertheless, developing its energy infrastructure based on wind, biomass
and solar photovoltaic is still a challenging task. The reason for this is that
Ukraine maintains a preference in its energy policy for dependence on fossil
fuels, thus cementing future “path dependencies” when policy decisions of the
past will determine future circumstances in the energy transition process (Orel
2016). The most recent example of Ukraine contradicting its obligations to
IRENA is the emergence of new patterns of fossil fuel dependence in US–
Ukrainian energy cooperation under the Donald Trump administration. On
10–12 November 2018, US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry visited Ukraine and
together with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko launched one of the so-
called US–Ukraine security dialogue series – but this time it would signiﬁcantly
beneﬁt US fossil fuels industries.4
The US is “touting its LNG as more reliable than pipelined gas from Russia,
but LNG is more expensive because of the costs of shipping and super-cooling
the fuel to the point where it becomes a liquid” (Reuters, 1 November 2018).
The LNG option is expensive, as Ukraine would need to build a LNG-receiving
terminal – but this costly choice might still help the country to diversify its
natural gas needs. However, it is important to highlight that, besides the US
and Ukraine, Turkey also needs to support this project since LNG will pass
through Istanbul. Moreover, the US coal industry that is supported by the
Trump administration has found a new market in Ukraine due to the military
conﬂict in Donbas. An important reason for obliging Ukraine to buy US coal is
that the latter’s domestic consumption of the commodity “has dropped to the
lowest level since 1983 due to closures of coal-ﬁred power plants that are
suﬀering from abundant, cheap supplies of natural gas” (Reuters,
1 November 2018). To help a declining US coal industry, Trypilska thermal
power plant has already received the ﬁrst supply of anthracite coal transported
from Pennsylvania (Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine,
10 November 2018).
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It can be concluded that there is very slow progress being made in inno-
vative and creative shifts in Ukrainian electricity transition policy, as well as
a lack of commitment to the transformation and modernisation of electricity
systems that should be based on promoting new business models backed up
by reformed political, regulatory and industrial infrastructures. There is a need
to boost the renewable energy investments that could not only provide
sustainable development but also ensure the country’s energy security, inde-
pendency and help create new jobs. In so doing, Ukraine ﬁrst and foremost
should seek to avoid simply transferring corruption, oligarch monopolisation
and informal practices from the fossil fuels industry to the renewables sector
(Aliyev 2016; Polese 2008).
In this sense, there is a chance that these nefarious practices can spread to
the renewables sector going forwards. As Ukrainian Prime Minister Vladimir
Grossman noted, “the main task is to make Ukraine an absolutely energetically
independent country that produces gas and develops alternative energy”
(Wageningen University Report, 19 September 2018, 22). However, to achieve
this Ukraine needs to simultaneously increase political will, decrease the
import of traditional energy fuels, eradicate corruption, overcome oligarchs’
monopoly and increase the domestic production of renewables. The reality on
the ground shows that this is not even close to being the case at present, as
according to Bloomberg one of the country’s richest oligarchs is now slowly
establishing his dominance over the renewables sector there (Sazanov 2018).
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that, despite remarkable natural gas and elec-
tricity reforms having indeed been undertaken, Ukraine still has signiﬁcant
work to do in order to secure its energy future. The timely implementation of
reform is needed in both the gas and electricity sectors. Ukraine has accepted
at least new legislation requirements in both of these sectors, as part of its aim
to stimulate and simplify the country’s energy transition. However, these laws
have not always been properly implemented due to strong corruption in the
energy sector, oligarchic power and a general lack of political will. In this
regard, proper implementation is necessary to achieve results in the short,
medium and long term; otherwise, they will lead only to further failed reform.
On its own, the EU’s inﬂuence has been ineﬀective in overcoming domestic
barriers to reform; it was Russia’s aggression that ﬁnally pushed Ukraine to
follow and implement EU rules, in fact. Current energy reforms are a good
example of this. The implementation of gas market ones in Ukraine indicates
that the process is not easy, linear or direct, and delays or forces outside of the
industry may shape the conﬁgurations of the business environment. As such,
gas market reform is occurring within a very problematic and complex institu-
tional context and is motivated by the need to improve deteriorating national
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ﬁnances rather than achieving optimal operational eﬃciency. The EU needs to
recognise this situation, depart from its supply-driven approach and avoid
exporting regulatory templates developed within the EU itself.
Simultaneously, Ukraine needs to make sure that the new energy laws are
systematically implemented by all government institutions and no room exists for
oligarchs to undermine these new laws and/or sideline them. More concretely, the
Ukrainian government should eliminate the established interests of oligarchs, and
make sure that they are not highly selective about the adoption of new reforms and
rules. Therefore, the government itself ﬁrst needs to fully embrace such reforms;
right now it seems that there is still no genuine political will yet and change is
mostly only enforced by international actors like the IMF, World Bank and the
EU. Second, after embracing reform, it will be necessary to establish an independent
judiciary and overhaul its Soviet mindset and corrupt system. Otherwise, this will be
another missed opportunity for Ukraine –which was the case in 1991–92 and 2004
too (Kuzio 2007). Although reforms in the natural gas sector assist Ukraine in
decreasing Russian energy leveraging, in the long term they do not enhance its
energy security and diversity. In other words, by depending on reverse gas ﬂows
Ukraine is becoming more dependent on Western energy companies rather than
diversifying its supplies per se. Themain question that Ukrainian government needs
to consider, then, is whether the gas coming from the West really does represent
diversiﬁcation – or whether it simply constitutes the re-routing of Russian gas.
For electricity sector reform, it would be signiﬁcantly more beneﬁcial for
Ukraine’s energy security in the long term to prioritise the development of its
domestic production – such as via RES. Avoiding the cementing of future path
dependencies on the fossil fuels industries is key, and particularly on coal and
gas – no matter whether the suppliers are Russian, European or from the United
States. To make Ukraine energy independent, the country needs to reduce the
import of traditional energy fuels and increase domestic fossil fuels and renew-
ables production in tandem. Ukraine should also seek to avoid importing tradi-
tional corrupt practices in renewables – though, the reality on the ground shows
that the opposite is currently happening. Finally, Ukrainian politicians should not
determine energy price but the market should instead be responsible for it.
In terms of the limitations of this paper, we have focused particularly on the
natural gas, electricity and renewables sectors, which has left other ones
unexamined. More speciﬁcally, the oil, coal, nuclear and LNG sectors could
not be discussed due to the limited space and scope of the paper. In this
regard, further research is necessary to address developments and require-
ments in these energy sectors too.
Notes
1. This a legislative package for the internal gas and electricity markets in the EU, with
its purpose being to further open up these two markets.
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2. The new energy strategy of Ukraine includes: reducing energy-import dependency,
diversiﬁcation of sources and routes of energy supply, security of production and
deliveries of energy, energy eﬃciency, a competitive energy market and the moder-
nisation of related institutions (for the full document, please see: Ukraine-Oﬃce EU
2018).
3. Since 2014, Gazprom and Naftogaz have been locked in a legal battle over contrac-
tual obligations concerning supply conditions and the terms of gas transit. The
disputes are currently being considered by the arbitration tribunal in Stockholm. In
May 2017, the tribunal issued a preliminary decision and reportedly rejected
Gazprom’s claim that Naftogaz had violated take-or-pay provisions in their sales
purchase agreement. Under these provisions, Naftogaz would have been obligated
to pay for excessive volumes of gas each year regardless of actual demand; Gazprom
sought penalties amounting to USD 34.5 billion for gas supplies not delivered. In late
December 2017, the tribunal appeared to conﬁrm its May decision in further ﬁndings
regarding the questioned gas price.
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